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rental from the purchaser,39 or unreasonable delay such as to constitute
laches, 40 may preclude the mortgagor from getting his equitable relief,
he would do well to assiduously avoid any conduct or inactivity which
might work an estoppel on him in his attempt to have the sale set aside.
This would seem true in some measure of this case. The mortgagor,
so far as appears, made no attempt to warn prospective buyers, and
waited five years after the sale to bring this bill to account and redeem.
On the other band, instances of hardship are quite concei' able in cases
where, through absence, mistake, or ignorance, the mortgagor may not
have actually known of the sale, and hence have given no notice or
indication that the sale was wrongful before an innocent purchaser for
value bought. If, in addition, the mortgagee who has perpetrated the
wrong prove insolvent, under North Carolina law as it has been shown
to be, it would seem that an innocent mortgagor would have no remedy.
Albeit this may work hardships in isolated cases, it is submitted that
from the standpoint of logic as well as of social policy, the North Car-
olina court is entirely consistent in upholding the rights of an entirely
innocent purchaser without notice, as against those of an innocent
mortgagor who through some inadvertence has failed to make use of
the safeguards afforded him in his character of landowner.
A. H. GRAHAM, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Power to Exercise Previous Restraint
on Freedom of Speech and Assembly.
An ordinance forbade public parades or public assemblage in or
upon the public streets, highways, public parks or public buildings of
Jersey City without a permit from the Director of Public Safety, who
could only refuse a permit for the purpose of preventing a riot, dis-
turbances, or disorderly assemblage. The circuit court of appeals,'
modifying and affirming the district court,2 held the ordinance uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it permitted previous restraint upon the
right of freedom of speech in a public place and forbade peacable assem-
blage except upon terms repugnant to free speech, contrary to the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment. On certiorari the United States
Supreme Court affirmed this decision, with modifications.
3
" Flake v. High Point Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 204 N. C. 650, 169 S. E.
223 (1933).
,0 Schwartz v. Loftus, 216 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); see First Nat. Bank
of Opo v. Wise, 235 Ala. 124, 128, 177 So. 636, 639 (1937); Walker v. Schultz,
175 Mich. 280, 292, 141 N. W. 543, 548 (1913).
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
3rd. 1939).
'Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127 (D. N. J.
1938).
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct.
954, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 928 (1939).
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Freedom of assembly was recognized in the English Bill of Rights 4
and has become firmly fixed in the English legal tradition. The col-
onists brought it with them to America, where it has been secured to the
people against encroachment by the states in at least forty-four state
constitutions. 5 In the beginning it was secured against encroachment
by the National Congress under the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. In recent years, United States Supreme Court decisions
have secured it against encroachment by the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
7
In England and America freedom of speech and assembly have been
limited by the common law prohibitions against riot, rout, unlawful
assembly, and breach of the peace." However, the fear that an assembly
may lead to such consequences does not in itself justify its prevention.0
Blackstone said, "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal mat-
ter when published."' 1  This doctrine of previous restraint has been
uniformly adopted by the United States Supreme Court."1
Under the doctrine, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a
statute which authorized the courts to restrain any publication which
regularly produced scandalous, malicious or defamatory matter,12 a
statute taxing newspaper advertisement receipts according to whether
or not the paper had a circulation of twenty thousand,13 and a city ordi-
nance prohibiting distribution of literature on the streets without a per-
mit from the city manager.14 It has also been indicated that the fact
that publication of certain materials would lead to public disturbances
and breaches of the peace would not justify imposing previous restraint
on the publication. 15 In the instant case the court declared invalid on
'Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 Wixu. & M., sess. 2, c. 2.
'.Jarrett and Mund, The Right of Assembly (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REy. 1.
The North Carolina constitutional provision is found in N. C. CoNST. art. 1, §25.
U. S. CoNsT. Amend. I.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. ed. 1108 (1927) ; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937) ; Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
' Jarrett and Mund, loc. cit. supra note 5.
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1939).
4 BL. Comm. *152.
Walsh, Freedom of Speech and Press (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 161.
12 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
' Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L. ed.
660 (1936).
" Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).




its face an ordinance authorizing the Director of Public Safety in Jersey
City to refuse permits for public assemblies "for the purpose of pre-
venting riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblages". The court said
as to this ordinance: ".... it permits the imposition of previous restraint
upon the right of the indivialual to speak before an assembly of his fel-
lows in a public place. The ordinance therefore prohibits peaceable
assemblage except upon terms repugnant to free speech".'0 The theory
of these cases seems to be that the risks of suppression are greater than
the risks of riot.
In relation to disorderly assembly, state statutes, which, generally,
make it unlawful to be a member of any organization which advocates
industrial or political change by force or violence, have been upheld by
the Supreme Court.17 The Court has taken the view that such statutes
are presumed to be constitutional unless proved to be an unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise of the police power. Where the indictment is
for the language used advocating such changes by violence, the Court,
after finding the validity of the statute, looks only to find if the lan-
guage came within the prohibition.' s However, it has been suggested
that the language ought to be tested as to whether it has a clear and
present danger to bring about the substantive evils which the state has
a right to prevent. 19
Public authorities thus required to run the risk of riot in the effort
to give life and meaning to the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and assembly may, nevertheless, take legal measures to reduce the risk.
The great majority of cases take the view that a permit may be required
in order to use public property for lawful assemblies,20 but the standards
which should govern the issuance of these permits are not clearly de-
fined. The courts agree that a city may require a permit to protect its
streets and parks from congestion and interference with normal use
when this is the primary consideration of the ordinance.2 1 Most of the
18 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774, 782 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1939).
17 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925) ;
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L: ed. 1095 (1927);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. ed. 1108 (1927).Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
See dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672, 45 Sup.
Ct. 625, 632, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1148 (1925) ; concurring opinion in Whitney v. Cal-
ifornia, 274 U. S. 357, 372, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 647, 71 L. ed. 1095, 1104 (1927).
20 Davis v. Massachusetts. 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897);
Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567. 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Abrahams,
156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 79 (1892) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 87 N. W. 785
(1901); People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921);
note, The Hague Injunction Proceedings (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 257.
21 Sullivan v. Shaw, 6. F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (ordinance requiring
permit from city council to parade on certain streets) ; In re Flaherty, 105 Cal.
558, 38 Pac. 981 (1895) (ordinance prohibiting beating of drums and certain other
loud noises on ithe streets without permission of the police) ; State v. Coleman,
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ordinances requiring permits leave the granting and denying thereof to
certain officials without laying down any rules for guidance. A number
of cases have held such ordinances unconstitutional since they leave the
issuance of permits to the arbitrary discretion of one person or group.
22
The majority view, however, is that these ordinances are constitu-
tional.23 It has been suggested, however, that limitations on the exer-
cise of discretion are to be implied, the discretion being confined to
considerations of the normal use of the streets and parks or other rea-
sonable considerations. 24  It has also been held that the exercise of
discretion is subject to review by the courts,2 5 so that it would seem
that, even under this view, the issuing official may not act merely from
whim or caprice. Such ordinances must be uniform and apply equally
to all persons similarly situated,26 so various ordinances excepting
96 Conn. 190, 113 At. 385 (1921) (ordinance prohibiting making of speeches on
the streets except by permission of the chief of police) ; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga.
567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) (ordinance forbidding public meetings in the streets
without consent from the mayor and council or mayor and chairman of board of
police commissioners) ; Burkitt v. Beggans, 103 N. J. Eq. 7, 142 At. 181 (1928)
(ordinance requiring permit to speak on streets); Buffalo v. Till, 192 App. Div.
99, 182 N. Y. Supp. 418 (4th Dep't. 1920) (ordinance prohibiting participation in
any parade or assembly which had not been authorized by written permit from
mayor); People ex reL. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921)
(ordinance requiring permit from mayor to hold public meetings in the street) ;
Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 Atl. 130 (1920) (ordinance requiring permit
from mayor to make speeches on the streets) ; see Anderson v. Tedford, 80 Fla.
376, 379, 85 So. 673, 674 (1920) (ordinance prohibiting public meetings on streets
without consent of mayor or majority of city councilmen); Commonwealth v.
Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 60, 30 N. E. 79 (1892) (rule of park board that there
could be no orations in the park without their prior consent).
2 State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 Atl. 385 (1921); Chicago v. Trotter,
136, Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359 (1891) ; Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac.
719 (1888) ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) ; In re Garrabad, 84
Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104 (1893).
" Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897)
(ordinance requiring permit to use Boston Common to make speeches, etc.) ; I;
re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 38 Pac. 981 (1895); Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist.,
364. Ill. 90, 4 N. E. (2d) 1 (1936) (ordinance prohibiting public speeches and
meetings in Soldiers' Field without permit, and forbidding use to speak on con-
troversial political and economic subject) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 87
N. W. 785 (1901) (ordinance prohibiting public addresses within a half mile
radius of the city hall except by permission of mayor) ; People ex rel. Doyle v.
Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921) ; note, The Hagite Injunction Proceed-
ings (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 257. In a number of cases no mention is made of the
fact that issuance of permits was left to the discretion of one or more officials, the
courts apparently assuming the ordinance to be valid on this point. Fitts v. At-
lanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Burkitt v. Beggans, 103 N. J. Eq. 7, 142
At]. 181 (1928) ; Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun. 620, 4 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1889).
2" See Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill. 90, 111, 4 N. E. (2d) 1, 10
(1936) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 551, 87 N. W. 785, 788 (1901) ; People
ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 102, 133 N. E. 364, 366 (1921).
2 People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921).
2' Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Anderson v. Wellington,
40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719 (1888) ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) ;
People v. Garabed, 20 Misc. 127, 45 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1897); Commonwealth v.
Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913); Commonwealth v. Curtis, 55 Pa. Super. 184
(1913) ; In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104 (1893).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
named groups from their operation have been held invalid.27  How-
ever, it has been suggested that this does not necessarily preclude
classification of different types of assemblies and the requiring of per-
mits only for certain types if the classification is reasonable.2 8  In two
cases where permits were refused because of the fear of riot or disorder,
the action of the issuing authority was upheld, 29 and the ordinance in
the instant case was upheld in a state court mandamus proceeding. 0
However, in the light of the othei permit cases, these three cases appear
to ,be out of line.
W. 0. CooKE,.
Torts-Debtor and Creditor-Intentional Infliction of Fright-
Liability for Resulting Mental and Physical Injury.
A creditor gave to the defendant, a credit reporting agency, a debt
for collection which was owed the creditor by the plaintiff, the operator
of a dry-cleaning establishment. The plaintiff was suffering from high
blood pressure, due to which he had lost, but was slowly recovering,
his sight; to effect a recovery it was necessary that he be free from
worry and excitement. The defendant sent the debtor three letters
containing threats of action which would be taken by the defendant
and the creditor if the debt were not paid; namely, the reporting by
the defendant of the plaintiff's "poor pay" record to the members of
its credit association, and the institution by the creditor of some of the
various legal proceedings open to creditors. The plaintiff suffered a
relapse upon receipt of the letters, and sued for damages, alleging
malicious intent on the part of the defendant. The defendant's de-
murrer was sustained in the lower court, but overruled in the circuit
court, on the ground that to indulge in conduct intended or likely to
2 Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719 (1888) (ordinance for-
bidding parades and assemblages on the streets without consent of mayor except
funerals, fire companies, state militia, and United States troops); it -re Frazee,
63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) (ordinance requiring a permit from mayor
and councilmen -to hold a parade with the exception of funeral and military pro-
cessions); Commonwealth v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913) (ordinances for-
bidding parades and assemblages on the streets -without notifying the police, except
the National Guard, fire and police departments, and Grand Army of the Repub-
lic) ;'In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W' 1104 (1893) (ordinance forbidding
marching on certain streets without written consent of the mayor except fire com-
panies, state militia, and funeral processions, and providing that no permit could
be refused to any political party having a regular state organization).
38 People ex tel. O'Connor v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745 (1934)
(ordinance requiring permit only for public worship on the streets and not for
other types of assemblages).
"Sullivan v. Shaw, 6 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (however, this decision
was based also on the fact that the parade for which the permit was requested
might congest traffic) ; Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill. 90, 4 N. E. (2d)
1 (1936) (this decision was based partly on the ground that all parties were not
properly before the court).
"0 Thomas v. Casey, 121 N. J. L. 185, 1 A. (2d) 866 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
1939]
